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A Response to the Idea of Moral Resilience as a Remedy for Moral
Distress I think that despite its precise
definition, the typical use of the concept of moral distress confuses and conflates too many things, and that
while ‘moral resilience’ is important
for coping with any of them, moral
resilience is not the answer or even an appropriate solution to the problem
of moral distress. It is treating only the symptoms of a serious
problem that needs to be treated at the root, not just the periphery. As an old man on 60 Minutes said one time in a meeting where savings and loan
officials told customers that all their savings had been lost and that free
counseling was being made available to them, ‘Son, we want you to give us our
money back, not make us feel good that you stole it.’ He wasn’t seeking moral resilience, but moral
remedy. Nurses (and others who suffer
moral distress) need remedy, not just resilience. Making, or being able to make, the best of a
bad situation does not make it right to create or permit bad situations. The best way to point to problems
with the concepts and ideas involved is to do a “close reading” of papers about
it such as the recent review paper, by advocates of moral resilience, extolling
moral distress as an opportunity for developing it: “Moral Distress: A Catalyst
in Building Moral Resilience”, by Cynda Hilton Rushton, Meredith Caldwell, and
Melissa Kurtz in AJN [American Journal of Nursing], July 2016, Vol. 116, No. 7 (http://www.nursingcenter.com/JournalArticle?Article_ID=3579853&Journal_ID=54030&Issue_ID=3579740). I had intended to just place responses in
their appropriate places in the paper to show that I was not misrepresenting
their points in any way, and to make it easy for the reader to follow their
arguments and mine. However in my own test of moral
distress, AJN’s policy is not to allow their articles to be anywhere else, even
though this one is available free on their web site, and they don’t accept
rebuttal articles. So what I am going to
do is to summarize and/or paraphrase points I am responding to in blue font
below, and quote (in black font) the statements or parts of statements, where
my responses belong. I must say here, in
the spirit of what the authors below seem to think is a component of moral
resilience, and I do not, that I do not understand journals, whose business it
is to seek truth, that will not even consider rebuttal articles to ones they
have already published. They do accept
letters of 300 or fewer words that state objections, but that hardly does
justice to explaining numerous problems in an article which represents flawed
emerging thinking likely to become conventional because of prevalence in the
literature. The article begins with an example problem that caused
moral distress for a nurse: a patient rushed to the facility with stomach pains
was diagnosed with a peptic ulcer and admitted for monitoring. Her nurse had a large patient load
already. The woman’s condition seemed to
be worsening, but the physician would not heed the nurse’s report and request
for a follow-up exam. The patient “was becoming
diaphoretic, her blood pressure was rising, and her oxygen saturation level was
dropping.” The nurse’s
“intuition told her something was wrong… She made several calls to the admitting physician but was
unable to convince him that [the patient] needed further evaluation.” She should not have had to
“convince” him beyond giving him the facts she did. He should have been concerned enough about
the patient, given those facts to further evaluate the patient. “She
informed the charge nurse and the nursing supervisor of the situation and
documented her assessment in the patient’s electronic medical record.” Documentation “covers” her
liability minimally if the patient were to suffer from the lack of follow-up
care by the doctor, but it doesn’t help the patient. And if neither the charge nurse nor the
nursing supervisor do anything to help the patient directly or by making the
doctor (or another doctor) tend to her, again, none of that solves the medical
problem for the patient. The nurse had more patients in
need of attentive care than she could reasonably give. “She felt that
she was ‘spread so thin’ that she couldn’t provide safe, high-quality care to
any of her patients, and she also felt that she was failing as [the patient’s]
advocate.” These were not just “feelings” but reasonable assessment of the work
environment. Calling them feelings makes
it incorrectly sound as though this is an abnormal or overly sensitive response
to an acceptable circumstance that should be part of the job. It is not an acceptable circumstance; it
should not be part of the job. … “Every day, under a wide
variety of circumstances, nurses in all roles and specialties are confronted
with complex ethical questions that challenge their integrity.” This is not
a complex ethical question; the right act is not in doubt nor difficult to
decide; the patient was in fairly clearly abnormal distress and the physician
should have checked on her or got someone else to check on her, or at least
explained to the nurse why it was
not a problematic situation, and how he could know that (which seems highly
unlikely). And the nurse’s integrity is
not what is being challenged; it is her autonomy and liberty to do her job
properly. She is not being tempted to do
what she knows is wrong but wants to do and get away with; that would be a
challenge to her integrity. Instead, she
is being prevented by a wrong policy of authority from doing what she wants to
and what she knows is right and best for the patient. Furthermore, she has a responsibility for a
task she is not granted the authority to do.
That is not only morally frustrating, but morally wrong and
shameful. And primarily developing the
skill not to be professionally or personally troubled or incapacitated by it is
not the right or a sufficient response. “They struggle to balance
competing obligations to their patients and families, their colleagues on the
health care team, the organization where they practice, the surrounding
community, society—and themselves.” That is an entirely different kind
of ethical problem or dilemma. Moral
dilemmas, which are often vexing and difficult, can arise from conflicting
moral principles or elements within a principle or from conflicting prima facie
obligations until they can be resolved as to the most reasonable priority. And even then they can be emotionally
troublesome because choosing the least bad or least flawed option is not particularly
satisfying, nor is having to override one ethical obligation because of a
conflicting one that is stronger, which incorrectly makes a conscientious
person feel they have violated the weaker obligation. But making right moral decisions, even if
difficult and emotionally painful is not what moral distress is, according to
the standard definition used later by the authors. “Often working within
health care systems that are driven by cost concerns, external metrics, and
organizational expectations that undermine person-centered care,” -- no, not just that; they undermine doing the right thing for the patient, not just
because it is not person-centered in the sense of being personal, but in the
sense of being the wrong treatment or wrong thing to do to the patient (in this
case, withholding of follow-up diagnosis and treatment by the physician). Cost effectiveness in health care, while
important, is not the central ethical feature of taking care of patients. And pandering to whimsical patient
“satisfaction” at the expense of proper medical treatment for all is not a
valid policy either. It is not right to
do as little as possible to avoid work or liability. Patients deserve the
proper care insofar as it can be reasonably provided, not unreasonably withheld
to save physicians time or hospitals money for unnecessary and merely greedy
profit at the expense of the health of the patient. If we are going to make money the sole
purpose of ethics, then we should allow theft, fraud, and extortion, as well as
withholding proper treatment solely on the basis of cost. We should also allow unsafe products on the
market if they are cheaper to produce.
When Ford Motor Company did not recall Pintos to remedy the exploding
gas tank problem for even low speed rear end collisions because it was
calculated to cost more than losses of wrongful death lawsuits, the jury found
out about saving money being their rationale for risking lives, and awarded
plaintiffs the largest amount of money up to that time to make sure Ford (and
other manufacturers) knew that if all they cared about was profit, profit would
have to be made to extrinsically reflect, incorporate, and foster morally
correct behavior in some way for those devoid of intrinsic moral sensitivity
and understanding, at least in cases like this involving known safety defects
that cost little to remedy. …“many nurses despair at
their inability to maintain their personal and professional integrity” – no; they despair at arbitrarily
and wrongfully being prevented from doing what is right for their patients.
“When they’re unable to translate their moral beliefs into
ethically grounded actions, moral distress ensues.” While that is true it is like
saying that when someone beats you, rapes you, and then shoots you and leaves
you for dead, it makes you sad, which may also be true, but is the least
important part of the problem, and is in a sense a secondary or peripheral
response to clear wrongdoing. …“moral distress … describe[s] the negative feelings
that arise when one decides on a morally correct action in a given situation,
but is constrained from taking that action.” But that is not the only salient feature in these kinds of cases. The other salient feature is that the
restraint is arbitrarily imposed by some sort of wrongful authority, policy,
law, or regulation, which apart from being simply a conflicting prima facie
obligation is actually wrong and could easily be remedied if there was the
proper will to do it. Moreover, there
will usually be a severe penalty for doing the right thing, in an attempt to
coerce the wrong choice by extrinsic harmful consequences to the agent (in this
case, the nurse). Constraints which are
beyond anyone’s control to overcome (see below) cause emotional frustration and
distress, but not “moral” distress of the sort that the usual examples of moral
distress involve. There are “two distinct
components of moral distress: initial distress, experienced in real time
as the situation unfolds; and reactive distress, which arises after the
situation has passed and involves lingering feelings about one’s failure to act
[in the way one knows is right]
on the initial distress. This reactive distress [is] also known as moral residue”
“Reactive distress” can come from second guessing
oneself, particularly in the hindsight of a bad outcome (or even a realized fluke,
lucky good outcome), from figuring out later how one might have handled it
better (though that may not have worked either), and/or from feeling later,
when rested, that one could have done more because one forgets the energy one
has later was not available at the time of the problem. And it can involve a feeling of guilt (even
if unjustified) for not having done more at the time, or known how, to avert
the outcome that one thought should be averted.
“Specifically,
moral distress occurs when one recognizes one’s moral responsibility in a
situation […] but is
then prevented from following through.” But prevented by arbitrary policies
or authority, etc., not by just natural obstacles. E.g., the inability to save patients in the
New Orleans hospital after Hurricane Katrina left it in sweltering heat with no
power and insufficient resources was traumatic, but not a case of moral
distress. It was frustrating and
difficult in a number of ways, some of which were moral, but it was not a case
of moral distress in the sense that providers were arbitrarily prevented in the
name of some wrongful moral policy or unreasonable regulation. “Moral distress is distinct
in that it involves the violation of one’s core moral values” – no; it is caused by the violation of one’s autonomy
and liberty to do what one knows is right; one’s values are not being violated,
and one is not violating one’s own values; one is simply being prevented from
acting upon them by an arbitrary obstacle, “has the capacity to erode personal integrity,
and may undermine moral identity.” -- again, all secondary effects of
being arbitrarily prevented from doing what one knows one should. At its heart, moral distress is a type
of suffering that arises in response to wrongful, (easily) preventable,
and arbitrary “challenges
to, threats to, or violations of professional and individual integrity.” … “ moral
distress is a widespread problem in health care, occurring not only among
nurses but also among physicians, pharmacists, therapists, social workers, and
others.” It occurs in any
field where one is prevented by wrong policies, rules, or authority from doing
what is right. One of my students had
been a soldier in Afghanistan whose duty was to accompany and protect convoys
between their base and the airport, on a road that was in a valley where the
mountains allowed the enemy to attack.
The policy was that no convoys should travel the road without air
support. On a morning when a number of
the troops were to head to the airport to go home now that they had finished
their tour of duty, the fog was pea soup thick.
Nevertheless the commanding officer was given the all-clear by the air
base saying they would be flying cover.
My student pointed to the fog and said that had to be some kind of
mistake – that visibility was clearly zero and there could not be air
support. The officer said the order was
clear and that the convoy was to embark.
Of course, there was no air cover, the convoy was sharply attacked, and
many of the people died, including members of his unit, along with many of the
soldiers who were still getting to finish their tour and go home, but not
upright. The military, the corporate
world, and basically any institution or bureaucracy provides ample evidence and
examples, usually on a daily basis, of moral distress. And in this soldier’s case there was ample
moral “residue”, feelings of guilt, error, conflict, second-guessing, and lack
of courage to stand up to his commanding officer – feelings of moral failure
and inadequacy, even though he still wasn’t sure it would have been right for
him to disobey a direct order or challenge the authority of a superior officer.
I did ask him which option was worse,
being disciplined or even put in the brig or dishonorably discharged or losing
all those lives, particularly of his close friends and fellow soldiers. Teachers forced to teach in ways which they know thwart
or diminish student learning also suffer moral distress, as does anyone not
allowed to do anything properly because of artificial constraints such as bureaucracy,
red tape, and ill-conceived rules. The
television series M*A*S*H pretty much
each week showed such problems but they were only morally distressing
momentarily for the characters in the program who were not averse to breaking
and/or circumventing rules in all kinds of clever, amusing, and sometimes
poignant ways – ways much easier to pull off and get away with in fiction than
in real life – in order to do what was right, and, again in fiction, more
clearly right. In regard
to not putting (or being allowed to put) patients’ care and rights first, “nurses face situations that threaten
their core values and integrity and put them at risk for not adhering to the
American Nurses Association (ANA) Code of Ethics for Nurses with
Interpretive Statements.”
While that is true, it is not totally
accurate, for a couple of reasons: 1) Nurses have obligations
within their institutions and the field of medicine to follow directives of
physicians, supervisors, and hospital rules and policies. These people are supposed to have superior
knowledge, experience, and wisdom, and so a nurse may feel that her diagnosis
of the patient’s needs is mistaken. So
there is a genuine moral quandary rather than simply moral distress at that
point. Moral distress is only the
problem of not being allowed to do what one knows is right, not just being
caught between conflicting directives.
So-called ‘moral residue’ occurs later when it is clear that the
authority that was obeyed was mistaken and the patient suffered harm or death,
or would have, had someone else with greater authority or medical judgment not
intervened and pointed out the error. If the authority was not
mistaken, but the nurse’s diagnosis was, and that had become clear in time
and/or after consultation with other physicians who were more explanatory about
the actually harmless causes of what the nurse perceived in the patient, there
would have been no moral residue because there would have been no moral
error. Moral residue only occurs where
the belief remains that the agent made the wrong moral choice, particularly if
they feel they did not show the proper moral fiber, resolve, courage, backbone,
responsibility to do what they thought was right. 2) While nursing codes of ethics
have right principles in requiring nurses to consider patient safety and rights
paramount, they have little teeth and are rarely enforced in the nurse’s
favor. A few recent lawsuits are some of
the first to be successful, at least so far in the judicial process, but few
nurses have the time or resources to fight such battles, and even when one
wins, it can be at the cost of nursing for years, if not for the rest of their
lives. In that regard the nursing code of
ethics is a sham because it is not really supported by nursing
associations. Instead of helping nurses
do the right thing by their patients, it merely makes them feel even more
guilty for not be willing to jeopardize their career over doing the right
thing. Nursing codes of ethics are like someone
saying “Go ahead and charge the shooter, I’ll cover you” when you know they are
not going to cover you. Nursing
association codes of ethics provide encouragement for martyrdom, not protective
support for morality. Instead of
removing the need for exceptional courage to do what is right for patients,
they make it require even more heroism and potential sacrifice than is fair to
expect from any agent while merely unrealistically hoping and disingenuously
imagining that every agent will rise to the occasion. They put nurses in an even more morally
untenable situation and then blame them for not doing the right thing, while
allowing them to be punished for doing what is right and what they say they
require. Later in the article, the
authors write about moral distress being a catalyst for moral resilience,
essentially developing moral strength, courage, and resolve, but it is the near
miss cases that are better for that because in those, no irremediable harm is
done in teaching the lesson. It is
better to regret not having been more forceful (or manipulative) in making
one’s case, learn from the error, and resolve to do better in the future over an
instance that resulted in no significant harm, than to learn that lesson from one
where harm was done and one then has to bear the responsibility and guilt for
the disastrous consequences along with the shame of lack of sufficient resolve
and moral courage. … “For the individual, moral distress can result in debilitating frustration,
anger, and guilt. Unacknowledged or
unjustifiable moral compromises can lead to the deterioration of one’s moral
integrity and possibly of one’s moral agency, which has been defined as
“having the capacity to make moral judgments and to act upon them” despite
personal or institutional constraints.” This is convoluted.
Moral distress doesn’t “lead to” deterioration of one’s capacity to act
on one’s moral judgments; as defined in their article, it is the result of not having the capacity to act
in accord with one’s moral judgment.
Moral distress is the result of unnecessary and wrongful conflicts that
make fulfilling normal moral obligations require unnecessary moral courage and
willingness to be a self-sacrificing martyr.
While that may make someone feel they
are guilty and feel they have lost
their integrity, it really instead causes an anxiety that feels like guilt for
not being able to meet an unfair and unrealistic expectation which cannot by
its nature then be a real duty, but is transformed into a saintly or heroic act
– what philosophers call a “supererogatory” act that is one over and above the
call of duty. You cannot reasonably,
realistically, and morally give nurses a responsibility without the
accompanying authority and protection from punishment and penalty for doing
what is right. Yet that is what the
system does. And nurses are supposed to
cope with that and develop resilience?
(“The beatings will continue until morale improves.” “Walk it off; grow
up.”) “Guilt” is not the appropriate
word for not being a martyr in an unnecessarily unfair situation – one in which
one is, by definition, constrained from doing what is right – and in the kinds
of cases at issue, constrained to the extent one is essentially prevented from
doing what is right. Anger, frustration,
righteous indignation are understandable and reasonable. Anxiety, sorrow, and regret for being put into
an untenable situation are most reasonable, but anxiety, sorrow, and regret of
that sort should not be confused with guilt. “Long-term psychological consequences can include withdrawal, emotional
exhaustion, depersonalization toward patients, and burnout.” Those
are natural reactions to being unnecessarily and repeatedly forced into
terrible and avoidable situations, which is why the remedy should be to prevent
such situations, not train nurses to adjust to them and try to cope. “Repeated or prolonged experiences of moral distress and moral residue
can interact, resulting in what Epstein and Hamric call the crescendo
effect, in which ‘new situations evoke stronger reactions as a clinician is
reminded of earlier distressing situations.’” One would think
that prolonged or repeated stress on its own weakens anyone or anything,
whether it invokes memories or not. “Because moral distress affects such a wide range of health care
professionals, it stands to reason that it may be a factor in teamwork erosion,
decreased quality of patient care, and poor patient outcomes.” No, it is not the distress that causes
this; it is the behavior that causes the distress which also causes this! If a
physician or administrator won’t let a nurse do what s/he knows is right for
the patient, it is not the nurse’s distress that causes the breakdown in
respect or cohesion, it is the physician’s or administrator’s actions that
causes it; and the disrespect is justified. … “Moral distress has been associated with perceived failure to meet patients’
and families’ needs and perceived decreases in the quality of patient care.
It also increases nurses’ risk of
burnout, decreased job satisfaction, and even departure from the nursing
profession.” Again,
no! It is not the nurse’s distress at
being prevented from best serving the patient that causes these things; it is
the nurse’s unnecessarily and repeatedly being prevented from doing his/her job
right that causes the moral distress and the emotional withdrawal, etc. It is not about a “perceived” failure to meet
patients’ and families’ needs but about an actual, unnecessary, forced failure
to do so. Experienced care providers
know there are limitations to their being able to prevent patients from dying
or in some cases, suffering, and they have various healthy ways to try to cope
with the sadness, disappointment, and frustration of that and to feel,
accurately, they have done everything they could. But the kinds of cases that cause moral
distress, withdrawal from patients and other avoidance reactions, burnout, job
dissatisfaction, quitting nursing are
ones where the limitations are imposed on them in a morally wrong way by people
with authority over them. It is bad
policies and the bad actions of (likely bad) people in authority that make it
very difficult, and in some cases impossible, for nurses to do their jobs
properly and take care of patients in a caring way they know is best. If you are not allowed to take care of
patients in a caring way, but still need to take care of patients, you are
bound to have to relinquish at least some of the caring way, and then mistakes
can more easily happen. Nurses are
unnecessarily put into an untenable position and then blamed for the results of
it. … “A lack of self-confidence may cause nurses to
hesitate in voicing their concerns or to withdraw from conversations
altogether. In some settings, nurses may fear
retaliation, such as job termination, if they make their moral stance known.” Lack of
self-confidence is not the same thing as reasonable fear of punishment. “The sense of being ‘voiceless’ during morally complex conversations can
lead to feelings of powerlessness and can hamper the ability to bring one’s
perspective to the discussion.” Being prevented from speaking up through disdain or
punishment makes one actually be powerless and unable to bring one’s
perspective to the discussion. This is
not about “feelings” of powerlessness but about powerlessness. … Moral distress is also associated with moral
sensitivity, Of course it is, because moral
sensitivity is what helps one see what is right and want to do it; so if you
either do not know or do not care what is right, you are not likely going to be
distressed by not being able to do what you know is right and want to do … “The relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress is
unclear. It’s possible that clinicians with diminished moral sensitivity
experience higher levels of moral distress, either because they fail to
recognize and explore the ethical aspects of a case, or because they retreat to
self-defensive actions and a ‘cover your tracks’ mindset.“ That does not fit the definition the authors use of moral
distress, since it does not involve constraints upon doing what they know is
right. “Covering your tracks” to avoid
punishment is not moral distress; it is a wrongful response to having done what
was wrong in the first place and now trying not to be caught and punished. And remorse and regret over being caught,
and/or suffering from being punished are not moral distress either. Moreover, many conscientious
nurses know of lazy co-workers whose patients they had to assist in order for
the patients not to suffer. Conscientious
nurses often have to do their own work and the work of their insensitive colleagues. It is not just nursing shortages, but the
shortage of good, caring, sensitive, responsible nurses, that can cause
persistent untenable conditions involving moral stress when managers or
administrators will not remedy the problem. … “One common team factor that can trigger moral distress is intra-team
conflict.” It is only moral conflict caused
by clearly wrong policies or bad authority that triggers moral distress. Distress
from difficulties beyond anyone’s control causes emotional distress,
frustration, or disappointment and sadness, of a different sort. Even reasonable moral disagreement does not
necessarily or likely cause moral distress.
If one sees the rationale for a particular requirement is at least
reasonable, and possibly right, even if one thinks it wrong, that doesn’t tend
to cause moral distress even if it may be disappointing in some way. … “A culture characterized by intra-team conflict, excessive workloads, and
contentious power dynamics can prevent individuals from acting as moral
agents.” That just means that those
factors prevent people from doing the right thing. “It’s worth noting that such factors make it harder for nurses to adhere
to Provision of the ANA’s Code of
Ethics, which states that ‘the nurse, through individual and collective
effort, establishes, maintains, and improves the ethical environment of the
work setting and conditions of employment that are conducive to safe, quality
health care.’” Of course; no
individual can be responsible for the bad behavior of others who will not
listen to or heed them. It is necessary
for any given individual to be cooperative and decent in order to have cohesive
teamwork, but it is not sufficient. A cooperative
nurse thwarted by bad supervisors or policies is not reasonably accountable for
the conflict, workload, power dynamic, or the “ethical environment” of the
workplace or the conditions of employment that are conducive to safety and
quality. “Other system-based sources of moral distress include … limited
human and material resources.” No; only
when limited human and material resources are caused by wrong decisions by
people who will not listen to reason about them. Again, it is not moral distress that is caused by losing a patient through lack of
knowledge or lack of resources that could not be reasonably expected to be
available, such as a suitable healthy organ or a transplant surgeon in some
remote area, etc. … “Despite its many negative effects, moral
distress can precipitate positive, growth-producing experiences” as can many other forms of
suffering, but that doesn’t make suffering a good thing, particularly
unnecessary suffering. … “For example, in recently
published narratives, Pniewski and Hallett described experiences characterized
by high moral stakes and challenges. Pniewski, a hospice nurse, was a caregiver
for a dying patient whose views were racist and misogynist; Hallett, a
psychologist, found herself involved in a death row case. Though each struggled with complex ethical
issues, each retained her sense of integrity and exercised effective moral
agency.” Distress over having to do what is morally right but repugnant, or in
having to decide what is right between conflicting values, is not moral
distress in the sense defined; it is just the necessity of performing an
unpleasant moral duty or resolving a difficult moral dilemma to know what is
right. Moral distress is distress over
being forced to do what you know is wrong or not being able to do what you know
or believe is right because of some wrong arbitrary constraint. “This outcome stands in stark contrast to the
usual depiction of moral distress as inherently negative and disempowering.” A long section than follows that
lumps together various kinds of moral issues or problems under moral distress as already explained
above, and that also then goes on to confuse moral understanding, moral
courage, moral limitations, moral responsibility or agency, integrity, and
ability to resolve ethical problems in a reasonable way. It also confuses being empowered to cope with
moral distress with being empowered to prevent or eliminate it. As such, it is about being empowered to cope
with the symptoms not eradicate the root cause. I am omitting most of that discussion but want
to comment on one passage that really involves two different claims: “Ethics education is a vital component
in building an individual’s coping capacities and decreasing the intensity and
frequency of moral distress. There is evidence that nurses who have had ethics
education feel more confident in their ability to recognize and address morally
distressing situations, and are more likely to access ethics resources (such as
institutional ethics committees or consultation services) for support when
making ethically difficult decisions.” The authors then detail disagreements about which sorts of ethics programs
are more effective. It is my
contention that it is the quality of the ethics education that matters, not its
format. There are two things that need
to be taught/learned no matter how that is achieved: ·
amount, intensity, duration, significance
of the goods and harms an act will cause ·
fairness of the distribution of burdens
and benefits ·
deservingness ·
fairness to the agent doing the act or
expected or required to do it ·
risk of harm and other elements as well, and how
to prioritize them if and when they conflict. This component of ethics involves addressing ethical issues correctly – knowing what is right and
why. 2) the nature of personal
responsibility is mainly the ability to choose and refrain from choosing an act
from among options, and the ability to implement one’s choice even if the
choice or the act was psychologically difficult, but not excusably or
justifiably too unfairly difficult, to do.
This component of ethics involves knowing that one needs to address
what one considers to be an ethical issue or a wrong order in the first place, because one is responsible for choosing and acting as one does, as opposed to
either shirking responsibility for them or not recognizing one has
responsibility for them. Therefore
one is responsible and culpable for inexcusably doing something wrong or
inexcusably omitting to do something right if one could, and should have known
to, have chosen otherwise and could have acted upon that choice, even if the
choice or the act was psychologically but not excusably or justifiably too
difficult to do. It was,
for example, made clear at Nuremberg that “following orders” is not a valid moral
defense, excuse, justification, or reason for clemency for committing a wrong
act one should have known not to commit.
And my way of suggesting you think about this in regard to any order you
are given which you think is wrong, is to ask yourself “Imagine that orders you are given require you to do
something wrong, with a penalty for not obeying the orders; and also imagine
that someday someone else is in charge who will hold you personally accountable
for what you did, who may or may not have the same view of what you should have
done as your current supervisor or boss.
Would you rather be held accountable for doing what you thought was
right or doing what you thought was wrong, given that you don’t know which
choice will be punished? If you are
going to be punished, wouldn’t you prefer it to be for doing what you believed
in, rather than for what you didn’t believe in?” If we
look at the case of the student who obeyed the order to take the convoy through
the fog, he would clearly have chosen to be punished for disobeying the order
than to have all those people killed that were lost that day. He should have refused to obey the order. He should have insisted the commander
understand he was giving an order that was unnecessarily putting at risk the
lives of all the people in the convoy just for expediency and that clearly
there was no way the report of visibility that permitted effective air cover
could possibly be true. “May it please
the colonel to look out the window, sir!” Combining
both of these components, it important to understand that being responsible for
doing, or refraining from doing, an act does not tell you whether the act is
right or wrong to do or to omit from doing or what reasons and conditions might
excuse one from doing or omitting it.
There are two different questions: a) is the act or refraining from the
act your responsibility, and b) which option of all your choices and
possibilities is the right one. Good
ethics education, whatever its form, needs to teach how to determine both of
these components. Understanding
the nature of personal responsibility helps people see that they need to and
can address moral issues where they are being required to do something
wrong. That doesn’t mean their belief is
the correct one, but it needs to be taken into account and acted upon in an
ethical way in itself. That may involve
at least a reasonable policy for conscientious objection if the person’s
position seems wrong even after consideration of it. But all that is too involved to go into
here. It just needs to be seen to be
part of helping nurses develop what might be considered the moral courage or
resolve to stand up for their views. The
authors discuss helping nurses recognize moral distress, but I really do not
think that is necessary. It is readily
apparent to nurses when moral distress occurs – whenever they are unreasonably
required to do something they believe wrong or unreasonably constrained from
doing something they believe right, particularly when it requires them to do
what they have good reason to believe will cause or allow undeserved and
unwarranted harm to patients. They
clearly know when that happens, even if they don’t know good ways or the best
way in a particular situation to articulate or deal with it. … ”Direct attempts to improve an institution’s overall moral climate include
implementing ethics committees, ethics rounds, and ethics-based forums, as well
as strategies to improve the transparency of communication between
administrators and practitioners.” This mistakenly presumes that people will act reasonably
and in good faith on the information they have.
But the very example used, was one where the nurse pointedly and clearly
told the physician the patient needed follow-up examination and he ignored her. I think it highly unlikely that lack of clear
communication is the main problem in most moral distress cases, particularly
ones with a clear pattern, though it may be in some individual cases where one
party has knowledge they don’t articulate clearly that would resolve the
problem; but normally, particularly in cases that fit a prevalent pattern, it
is lack of reasonable understanding and cooperation. And also, while it is possible that a
reasonable explanation would show that the practitioner’s beliefs are untrue as
to what is right or needed in a given situation, and in such cases transparent
communication might resolve an issue, that does not mean that a first excuse or
rationale is sufficient, if a sensitive, conscientious moral person would find
a means to overcome the condition that is the rationale. ”Although
the Joint Commission now mandates institutional ethics committees for hospital
accreditation, nursing presence on these committees varies from institution to
institution. …
nurses … have unique
perspectives, and are needed on ethics committees …”… So now that this
is clearly and “transparently communicated”, is there any reason to believe it
will therefore happen or be effective if it does – that sensitive,
independent-thinking, medically and morally knowledgeable, nurses will be place on ethics committees and
that their ideas and evidence will be seriously and reasonably considered? I would guess not in those cases where staff
is not as appreciated as they should be. The authors then explain other
institutional ways to give nurses more voice and power. However, those also depend for their success
on their work and recommendations being heeded, which in the sorts of climates
that cause systemic or repeated moral distress, is not likely. … “Several factors make practice environments increasingly likely to
engender moral distress; these include nurse staffing shortages, increased
patient acuity” – again, only when these problems
are caused by entrenched bad judgment, policies, etc, not something like a
terrible, unexpected disaster that could not reasonably be anticipated or
prepared for in advance. People tend to
pitch in and work together when such a circumstance occurs, as in a natural
disaster or intentionally caused mass casualty act. And while such situations can be emotionally
traumatic, again that is different from moral
distress, which involves powerlessness to effect wrongful policies and orders. … “Mitigating
that will
require significant political as well as organizational change.” – except that it is moral and legal change that is
necessary, not just political change.
This is not just about what a majority wants, as if that were subject to
whim, but about being able to do what is right for patients and workers –
voluntarily whenever possible, but forcibly when it is not. … Efforts to reduce moral distress might be best
served by developing systems that [… involve] all stakeholders in establishing
or changing the ethical rules by which institutional decisions are made. Rule-based
systems tend to fail for all kinds of reasons: 1) loopholes, 2) insufficient,
inadequate, or bad rules, especially those overzealously and inflexibly
enforced, 3) people who either ignore or twist or interpret the rules to their
own advantage, 4) insufficient penalties to give the rules teeth, etc. Congress and Wall Street are examples of what
happens in rule-based systems operated by selfish people of bad faith. … moral dilemmas and
conflicts are an inevitable part of nursing practice; it’s unrealistic to
believe they can be avoided. But as pointed out repeatedly, it is not all moral
dilemmas and conflicts that are the problem; just those which are caused by
clearly wrongful recalcitrant policies, decisions, and orders. Indeed,
morally distressing situations offer opportunities for nurses to learn and to
maintain or restore their integrity and wellbeing. And
being shot or stricken with ebola gives one the ‘opportunity’ for recovering
from being shot or having ebola. That is
not the kind of opportunity anyone wants or should have to have. Being able to make the best of a bad
situation does not make it best to have bad situations, particularly ones that are avoidable. Nurses should not be put into situations where
they are not allowed to do what is right merely because of some wrong rule,
order, authority, policy, or monetary restraint based solely or primarily on
greed rather than reasonable lack of resources.
And nurses should particularly not be put into such situations in order
to build character, resistance, or ‘resilience’ to being put into unnecessary,
bad situations. There are enough real
problems in life to ‘help’ or force us to develop moral character, courage, and
strength, without putting people into artificial situations that are more
destructive than productive. Let’s imagine how the opening case might have
unfolded differently. When Ms. Keller [the nurse in the opening scenario] becomes
aware of her moral distress, her next steps are to consider and appreciate the
precipitating factors, name the ethical conflict, There
is no ethical conflict! And the cause of
the problem is clear; the physician is not doing the right thing for the
patient and is simply ignoring the nurse’s report and request. The problem is not the nurse’s moral
distress, but improper care of the patient by the physician. Making the problem her moral distress is like
saying that the problem with a person who just had a heart attack is that he is
lying on the floor; it confuses the result of the problem for the problem. and
examine why addressing it matters to her. She reconnects with her core values
and intentions as a nurse, which serve to ground her in determining what the
situation calls for and provide motivation for taking action. This is just jargon; the nurse cares about the well-being
of the patient and thinks for good reason that the patient is in jeopardy and
needs a follow-up examination. This is
not about the nurse’s well-being as somehow separate from or primary to the
patient’s receiving proper medical attention and care. … Ultimately, Ms. Keller determines which
actions are best aligned with the profession’s values, as delineated in the
ANA’s Code of Ethics --she had already
easily done that with regard to the patient-- and takes those actions but that is where the problem arises, because she is
restricted from taking those actions by other ethical, legal, formal, and
powerfully punitive forces. This requires steadfast effort, courage, and
ethical competence. But it takes much more than
that if it not just going to be an exercise in futile martyrdom. It did not take any particularly unusual
ethical competence to recognize her duty to her patient, or even her own responsibility
in trying to get the physician to re-check the patient. What she lacked was either the power to force
him to do what is right or the psychological skill and pressure point knowledge
to manipulate him into doing it. Ms. Keller further recognizes that she has an
obligation to foster a culture of ethical practice in her workplace. Besides
acting as a patient advocate for Ms. Dawkins, she bring her concerns about the
case to the nursing leadership and contributes to team efforts to address the
root causes of her moral distress. Except that
apparently nothing was done to get the patient, Ms. Dawkins, proper medical
attention; it was just documented that the captain was warned of the
approaching iceberg and the warning was duly noted in the ship’s log. It’s essential that nurses stop seeing
themselves as powerless victims of moral distress. Instead, nurses can
acknowledge that their moral distress arises from having a strong moral
compass—their deeply held values and the commitment to relieve the suffering
and promote the wellbeing of their patients.
That is not what is causing the moral distress. It is powerlessness to overcome the
physician’s refusal to do what is right and best for the patient. “Covering herself” by noting the problem to
the proper channels doesn’t solve the problem for the patient or relieve her
moral stress, since the problem for the patient is not solved. The nurse needs either the power to make sure
someone competent attends to the patient (by calling another physician, for example)
or having the ability to jeopardize the physician’s career in some way, or by
having the psychological skill to manipulate the physician into
compliance. Her problem is not an
ethical one but a lack of cooperation and compliance one. Nurses can step
forward in a new way—one that reflects their moral agency and courage which does no good if it does not get results for the
patient and is simply pointless self-sacrifice to assuage a mistakenly troubled
but actually innocent conscience that has done no wrong. “See What
Nurses Can Do to Address Moral Distress for some simple ways to begin to
shift one’s relationship to moral distress and build moral resilience. The
American Association of Critical-Care Nurses’ 2006 public policy statement on
moral distress (www.aacn.org/wd/practice/docs/ moral_distress.pdf) further
includes suggestions for how to engage one’s institution and its leaders in assessing
and improving the handling of morally distressing situations. Together, we can
develop more robust notions of moral distress and devise strategies that allow
us to meet morally distressing situations more effectively for all concerned.” It is my
view that expecting or requiring nurses to risk their careers to stand up
(often just futilely) for the well-being of patients (and themselves) and just
buck up to the challenge and cope resiliently with the consequences, is unfair
to nurses when nursing associations have much more power to effect the sorts of
changes which are clearly needed to empower nurses to meet what the codes of
ethics of nursing association, and what ethics in general, would say is
right. I
understand that medical professionals believe that strikes or work slowdowns
are normally wrong because they put patients in jeopardy in a way that is not
only counterproductive (in the short run at least) but hypocritical as a means
of trying to achieve better patient safety and care. But there are ways that nursing associations
can get better laws and hospital policies without having to call for or permit
general strikes or work slowdowns that jeopardize innocent patients. They should be putting all kinds of moral and
political pressure on lawmakers and hospitals to do better, reporting those
that endanger their patients and how they do that. Nursing associations
should be defending nurses in court who are in trouble for obeying the code of
ethics and their consciences and doing the reasonable or right act. They should be doing this not only to defend
individual nurses, but to set powerful precedents. The U.S. Constitution recognizes many civil
rights and liberties, but it and the courts need work with regard to developing
reasonable criteria and provisions for conscientious objection in areas other
than avoiding compulsory military service in time of war. Nursing associations can and should
contribute to this effort; there are plenty of cases for them to work with. Nursing
associations should also insure nurses against some amount of financial loss
from displaying moral courage in reasonable cases and meeting their code of
ethics. They should
also threaten to treat doctors and hospital administrators who become
hospitalized in compliance with their own policies and rules. In 1971, a movie The Hospital starring George C. Scott was a murder mystery with an
ingenious plot. A person who had lost a
loved one due to hospital ineptness and malfeasance caused the people
responsible to become patients in their own hospital for minor conditions. He then helped them be victimized by their
own procedures and ineptness. While the
Golden Rule can never serve to tell us what is right or wrong (because what you
want for yourself may not be what others want for themselves, and because even
if you both want the same thing, it may still not be right for either of you),
it often helps stir the soul to do what is right if one imagines being on the
receiving end of one’s own acts and policies one should already know are
wrong. Creative
and
compassionate minds should be able to find effective ways to overcome
institutional and professional resistance to minimizing or eliminating
moral stress in nursing, without simply doing a disservice to the
problem and
to nurses by telling, requiring, and relying on them, to develop moral
resilience to abuses that should not be permitted to occur in the first
place. |
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